Environmental protection is an inevitable issue that developing countries all have to deal with during the process of inviting foreign direct investment (FDI). However, high correlation between FDI and pollution doesn't necessarily indicate that foreign firms are to blame. In this paper, we apply firm-level panel data in Vietnam and unique information on waste discharge to show that foreign firms are actually more active to acquire ISO14001, a voluntary environmental standard. And the adoption will in turn improve firms' performance in waste control. It also increases firms' welfare as well as their productivity level. A theoretical dynamic game model lends support to our empirical findings. This paper provides strong evidence that firms' efforts towards corporate social responsibility will eventually benefit themselves as well.
Introduction
It is known to all that foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) has been a considerable driving force to spur the economic growth in developing countries, especially in newly-emerging economies. But rapid growth usually comes with a price-pollution. Given the simultaneous rise in FDI and pollution level, it is natural to think that a positive correlation might exist between these two. Critics have accused foreign investors of shifting their heavily-polluting activities to countries with lax regulations in search of "pollution-haven", however, empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis is surprisingly rare (Cole, 2004) . Actually foreign firms are found to be more energy efficient compared to state-owned firms (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; He, 2006) . This might be due to the advanced waste-processing technology adopted by foreign firms and their awareness to achieve corporate social responsibilities (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008) . Other stories include "protecting institutional reputation, appealing to 'green consumers', deterring lobbying and boycotts by environmental groups, avoiding regulatory scrutiny, and preempting future regulation" 1 . Under certain circumstances, we highly doubt the "pollution haven" hypothesis and propose the opposite idea that the more foreign firms invest in the host country, the more likely they become selfrestrained in the sense of environmental protection.
In this paper we would like to verify this hypothesis by evaluating firms' participation in a voluntary environmental program-ISO14001, in the context of Vietnam. ISO14001 is considered one of the most widely recognized voluntary standards 2 for Environmental Management Systems, whose adoption is likely to be incurred by firms' spontaneous act 3 . Thus the possibility of acquiring ISO14001 is usually positively associated with firms' willingness to involve in the environmental protection. By quantifying firms' efforts before and after attending this program, we hope to answer the following questions: are foreign firms more active to be involved in ISO14001 than their domestic counterparts? How can ISO14001 improve firms' overall performance, especially their efforts in waste control?
By applying various methods to clear these doubts, this study differs from the previous literature in several ways: First, it will be the first paper to explore how firms' participation in voluntary program affects the pollution behavior in Vietnam, thus fill in the research gap in the developing countries (Arimura et al., 2014); Second, the measurement will be based on multiple indexes, instead of single ones; Third, it combines empirical strategy with theoretical verification, which to our knowledge, is the pionerring one. After robustness check, we do achieve consistent results that support our hypothesis. The coherence, on the other hand, also leaves us the room for policy implications and future study. This paper is organized as follows: in the next section we talk briefly about the pollution situation in Vietnam. Literature review then comes after. In section 4 we describe the data and estimation strategy, followed by robustness check and findings. Section 6 presents the theoretical model and the final section concludes. 1 Quoted from Bui and Kapon (2012). 2 The environmental protection paradigm in developing countries is moving away gradually from compulsory approach to more flexible and voluntary ones (Tambunlertchai et al., 2013) . 3 Though some have argued that the adoption of ISO14001 is motivated primarily by domestic regulatory and market pressures (Khanna and Anton, 2002; Lyon and Maxwell, 2004).
Overview

About ISO14001
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) was founded in 1946, which has 165 members by far, each representing a country. It is the most prominent developer of standards in the world. In 1980s, ISO introduced ISO9000 standards for quality manufacturing practices. Building on this system, ISO set up ISO14001 environmental standards in 1996 4 . According to the definition by ISO, this standard enables firms to adopt the policy following the legal requirements and provides them with update environmental information. In other words, it forces the organizations to raise selfawareness of maintaining a healthy environment and assure themselves of conformity with their stated policies. The benefits of ISO14001 include, but not limited to: reduced cost of waste management and distribution; savings in consumption of energy and materials; improved corporate image among regulators, customers and the public (ISO Homepage). Thus despite the considerable cost to acquire ISO14001, the nature of it suggests sustainable benefit for the firms in the long run.
Why Vietnam?
In this paper we would like to focus on Vietnam, a typical example that witnesses both fast growth in foreign investment and industrial pollution at the same time. 5 . Figure 1 shows the structural change of the sectors in Vietnam. This is in line with Vietnam's national policy of rapid industrialization and transition from rural economy.
Meanwhile the pollution in Vietnam is considered to get even worse if the current pattern of industrialization continues and no further control is activated. Take air pollution, for instance, nearly half of Nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) emission is due to industrial development, and when it comes to Sulfur dioxide (S O 2 ) industry becomes the major criminal (Vietnam: Air Quality Profile 2010). These two kinds of pollutants are detrimental to both human health and the environment. Liquid (total suspended solids) and solid wastes (chemical and metal) also constitute a large portion of the total industrial discharge. Though Ministry and Departments of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) in Vietnam tries to record the pollution level in all aspects, the precise data is not available. Instead we approximate the amount of pollution in Vietnam by using the pollution intensity index constructed by World Bank's Industrial Pollution Projections System (IPPS). The same method has been applied in Mani and Jha (2006) , and Ngo (2010) . From Figure 2 , we can see that the total pollution has risen by nearly 150 percent over five years. To decompose the contents, we find that most of the increase comes from air and solid waste, suggesting a possible shift in the waste composition 6 .
3 http : //www.iso.org/iso/about/iso member.htm Accessed on 2014/11/25. 4 In recent years, ISO22000 food safety standards, ISO26000 social responsibility standards, ISO36000 risk management standards, and ISO50001 energy management systems are also introduced. 5 Review and analysis of the pollution impacts from Vietnamese manufacturing sectors (2008), a report conducted by World Bank. Hereafter referred to as Review (2008). 6 Review (2008) provides us with extra index: the most seriously polluted areas are those that experience the fastest economic growth, such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. They have the highest overall ranking Given the fact that FDI keeps flooding into Vietnam, it should be important and interesting to investigate what role foreign firms play in "contributing" to this wave of pollution. By using ISO14001 as the benchmark, we would like to measure the awareness of foreign firms' environmental protection and the post-adoption performance, compared with the case for domestic firms. If positive result is to be achieved for the foreign, then we can provide more evidence to refute the "polution haven hypothesis", at least in the context of Vietnam. (2003) all reach the unanimous conclusion that FDI has a negative impact on the pollution level in the host country. Based on this stylized fact but taking a step further, we would like to make explicit of the mechanism behind the phenomenon. We will divide the process into two steps: to find out how FDI (or firm's ownership in the micro level) affects ISO14001 adoption and the impact of ISO14001 adoption on firms' polluting behavior.
As for the first step, there are mainly two kinds of theories: convergence and divergence (Prakash and Potoski, 2007) . Convergence advocates claim that foreign subsidiaries usually conform to global standard rather than adapting to host country characteristics. In other words, if the subsidiaries come from a country with a high coverage of ISO14001 adoption, it is quite likely that these firms will also acquire the certificate in the host country. And within the convergence debate, the main stream opinion is that foreign firms face greater scrutiny from local government, which gives them more incentive to adopt ISO14001, or even encourage their suppliers. Thus FDI will have on the National Pollution Index. As for sectors, heavy industries are undoubtedly responsible for the major waste discharge. Both studies applied firm level data. In the macro level, similar result is achieved (Prakash and Potoski, 2006) . This paper will be aimed at re-evaluating FDI's role in the ISO14001 adoption preference.
The second step focuses on the relationship between ISO14001 adoption and firms' performance. There is a large theoretical literature to study the connection between compulsory regulations and firms' polluting behavior, but few are found to investigate voluntary program's impact (e.g. Lyon and Maxwell, 2008). The conclusion has been mainly drawn on empirical evidence. Previous studies have used single pollution measure to assess the impact of ISO14001 ( Our methodology is closest to that used in Blackman et al. (2010) . We will describe the estimation strategy and data in the following section. 
Estimation Strategy and Data
Estimation Strategy
For empirical verification we apply the firm level data in Vietnam. To account for the potential self-selection endogeneity problem, we incorporate it into a two-step sample selection framework.
where
Firstly we estimate the propensity of firms' decision to adopt ISO on a series of exogenous variables. ISO is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if firm i adopts ISO14001 at time t, otherwise 0. It's taken from the observed data. Z it in Eq. (1) is a vector of derterminants which lead to the adoption. It includes both objective and subjective firm characteristics. The former consists of firm size (number of labor), FDI (foreign capital/total capital) and capital-labor ratio while the latter includes answers based on the firms' self-evaluation, such as whether they follow the environmental regulations. U it is the error term.
X it in Eq. (2) has similar elements as Z it . But when the Heckman-style model is applied, exlusion restriction has to be met. Thus we include some of the subjective variables in the selection equation (Eq. (1)), but exclude them in the outcome equation. Basically we choose the explanatory variables consistent with Tambunlertchai et al. (2013) and Arimura et al. (2014) , but have to give up some (export status, ISO9000 certification, etc) because of data availability. Concerning dependent variable Y it , it has two sets of indicators: waste discharge and non-environmental performance (turnover, average salary and total factor productivity). Each variable of interest will be estimated separately 8 . Year dummies and industry dummies are included in both equations. See Table 1 for detailed description of the variables.
As for TFP, it needs extra effort. Since traditional solow residue's approach is unable to isolate the true productivity from statistical noise, recent literature has exclusively proxy methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) 9 . Unfortunately, due to quality issue, neither is the ideal method to be used in our analysis, though we use them as robustness check tools. Another option is stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). According to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) , given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the model for the SFA is specified as 10 :
where x it is a vector of inputs. v it is the noise component and u it is the nonnegative technical inefficiency component. Our objective is to obtain estimate of the technical efficiency which is the proxy for TFP of a particular firm.
where it is assumed that u i ∼ iid N + (0, σ 2 u ). The other options might include NormalExponential Model, Normal-Gamma Model. We will use them alternatively.
Data
This paper uses a panel dataset, constructed from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey at firm level. The data was collected by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam for all sectors and industries, as on March 1st annually. It covers all 22 manufacturing sectors out of the total 42. Company characteristics such as ownership, labor, capital stock, turnover, assets, FDI share, average wage rate, intermediate materials are also available. Apart from the above, GSO has taken a census of all multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are defined firms that have foreign capital, regardless of the share. The advantage is that investment behavior of these foreign capitalized firms can be captured over time. Census is also taken for firms with more than 10 employees. Each firm has an exclusive enterprise code. We use it together with province code to identify the firms.
Another uniqueness of this dataset is that it collects information on firms' engagement in enviromental protection, including the cost spent on enviromental protection, whether the firm carries out environmental management system, whether it follows the clean manufacturing process, etc. And above all, whether the firm has ISO14001 certification is recorded. Since it is relatively objective criteria which is free of measurement error, we use it to create our ISO adoption dummy. Unfortunately, the ISO information is only accessible from 2007 to 2009, we have to limit our analysis to this time period. Finally, the detailed data on waste discharge categorized by form (air, liquid, solid) is complete. It differentiates between treated and untreated amount of waste as well, which is important for us to conduct the second stage estimation.
Certainly we have to admit that the survey has its drawbacks. For example, the incomplete information about export and import, missing data for materials and other variables, inconformity of units among different years, etc. As a result, we have to deal with an unbalanced panel data here. We remove the missing observations necessary to calculate TFP, and delete outliers. After these arrangements, the total number of observations for estimation is 28274 over three years. 
Baseline Results
As can be seen from Table 2 , foreign direct investment, number of labor, waste department dummy and capital labour ratio, are statistically significant at the 1% level in the first stage. The estimated coefficient of FDI share is positive, which means that firms with foreign capital actively adopt ISO14001. The positive sign of total labor indicates that the larger a firm is, the more likely it is to adopt ISO14001. One explanation might be that larger firms have more capacity to partcipate in such voluntary programs. Meanwhile capital-labor ratio also plays a positive role, implying that capital-intensive firms prefer ISO14001.
In the second stage, ISO14001 is positively significantly at the 1% level in all kinds of cases. As long as waste discharge is concerned, ISO14001 adoptions increase the share of treated wastes in all three forms. The result provides evidence that once firms acquire this environmental certificate, they raise the awareness of environmental protection and try to control their polluting behavior.
On the other hand, the positive impact of ISO14001 on firms' total salary, turnover and total factor productivity is telling us another story. After firms adopt ISO14001, the cost of managing the waste is reduced and allow firms to have more resources (capital and labor) to allocate. As a consequence, it benefits the firms by shifting up their total performance. This verifies our hypothesis by showing that firms' devotion to the social responsibility can lead to a win-win situation. Table 2 is inserted here
Robustness Check
Apart from applying waste department as the determinant of ISO14001 adoption, we use totalcost environ, environ system and enviromental standard alternatively 11 . Concerning TFP calculation, Levinsohn and Petrin' method is also tried. We get similar and consistent results in almost all cases 12 . Next, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to re-confirm our findings. The purpose of our estimation is to find out the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which in this paper is the difference of performance between ISO14001 adopters and non-adopters. The accurate measurement needs random experimental settings, however, the counterfactual is usually unobserved. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the propensity score which can be used in our analysis to match the adopters with nonadopters. We will use the first stage equation as introduced in Section 5.1 to predict the likelihood a firm adopts ISO14001.
The challenge is that firms didn't report in which year they acquired ISO14001. Thus we use the information in year 2007 (the first year of the observation) to calculate firms' propensity score of ISO adoption. Then we match them with the firms in 2009 (the last year) that have similar propensity and compare their difference. If the performance indicators in these two years are significantly different, then we can make the judgement that ISO14001 has potentially promoted firms to improve. To proceed, we further asssume that by controlling the covariates, the error term will be uncorrelated with the decision of firms' adopting ISO14001 13 Our treatment sample (ISO14001=1) varies from 825 in year 2007 to 1201 in year 2009. The average value of each control variable for the treated is higher than that for the control. For example, the average TFP for the treated group is 0.56 compared to 0.49 for the control group. The estimation results are consistent with the statistical intuition. In Table 3 , we report results for both nearest 1-to-1 matching and kernel matching in each model. ATT estimates are all significantly except for solid waste. This indicates that by adopting ISO14001, firms' overall performance will be greatly improved.
Table 3 is inserted here
We conduct the balance tests (for matched) as well. The results of t test for each covariate does not reject the null hypothesis that the mean between treated and control 11 We attempt different estimation models such as ivtreatreg and change the options to heckit, 2SLS, etc. The results vary a little, but don't change considerably. 12 To save space, we did not report all the results but they are available. 13 In reality this assumption can be violated. For example, a policy shock in some industry might promote firms to apply for ISO, and an opposite scenario can also be considered. are equal, meaning the models balance the covariates quite well. Another evidence is that the standardized bias is 4.46% for kernel matching estimator while 1.38% for nearest 1-to-1 matching estimator. Based on the discussion in Caliendo and Kopeining (2008), standardized bias below 5% is enough to justify the balance.
Despite the strong evidence that ISO14001 improves firms' competitiveness, and raise their awareness of environmental protection, the estimation might still suffer from bias due to data limitation, as previously explained. More acurate result can be achieved if we have more detailed information on the background of ISO14001 adoption, e.g., why firms in some industries or areas have higher tendencey to acquire ISO, especially in the context of Vietnam. It also leaves us room for future study on whether ISO's impact is temporary or not.
6 Theoretical Model
General Setting
In this Section, we try to illustrate the mechanism behind ISO14001 adoption and firm's performance by applying a two stage dynamic games of complete but imperfect information, as described in Gibbons (1992, Chapter 2.2). Suppose there is an oligopoly market with only 2 firms. Both firms produce a homogenous good in the domestic market. In order to be more competitive, now we assume that firm 1 has the option to choose a strategy k in the first stage. In our model, to be specific, k means ISO14001 adoption. Then k becomes publicly observable. In the second stage, both firms simultaneously choose their output level q 1 and q 2 from R + respectively. The profits for each firm are π 1 (k, q 1 , q 2 ) and π 2 (q 1 , q 2 ), which are twice continuously differentiable. We make further assumption that π 1 is strictly concave in k. In the following we will analyze the cases with 2 profit-maximizing firms competing a la Cournot-Nash.
For firm 1 to realize maximum profit at stage one, firstly we total differentiate π 1 w.r.t. k:
where the second term on the RHS of Eq. (5) reflects k's influence on π 1 through q 1 . By envelope theorem, this term can be ignored. The third term is called "strategic effect", the sign of which depends on the several conditions. Given the fact the direct effect of k is always positve (i.e. 
By stability of Nash Equilibrium, the denominator of Eq. (7) is positive (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). Thus the "strategic effect" actually is determined by three factors:
Next we will discuss the cases and decide on the exact level of the "strategic effect" when the detailed forms of the production function are given.
Detailed Case Study
As outlined above, both firms compete over homogenous good, the price of which takes the reverse demand function p = a − q, where q is total output and q = n i=1 q i , i = f, d. f and d stand for foreign and domestic firm respectively. For simplicity, we ignore the marginal cost of production and the the initial cost to acquire ISO14001 14 . Foreign firm and domestic firm differ in their pollution abatement technology. It is reasonable to assume that foreign firm has better knowledge in the abatement and thus the marginal cost to deal with waste discharge for each firm has the following relationship: t f < t d . We further assume that the total waste is proportionate to the output of the firm, and it is equal to δq i , δ ∈ (0, 1), i = f, d. There are two cases that interest us: the one when only foreign firm adopts ISO14001 and the other when only domestic firm adopts ISO14001. We compare them with the case when no strategy is introduced. Finally we will discuss whether the incentives for foreign and domestic firms to adopt ISO14001 are the same. 
To maximize each firm's profit, we take the first order condition and derive the best reply function for each firm in Nash Equilibrium:
The subscript number here indicates the equilibrium output for each firm in case 1.
The same rule applies to the subsequent cases. Accordingly, we can get firms' profits at equilibrium as:
Case 2: Only foreign firm has adopted ISO14001 in the first stage.
14 In reality ISO status needs to be renewed regularly and the update should incur extra cost. We will not include such cases in this paper but the detailed discussion is available upon request. Now foreign firm becomes firm 1 described in the general setting. At this time we assume that foreign firm can be rewarded with an extra consumer surplus because ISO14001 tends to decrease the management cost of the waste handling. Let z be the weight assigned to consumer surplus, and z ∈ (0, 1). Thus foreign firm's profit function now becomes:
meanwhile domestic firm's profit stays the same:
The best reply function for each firm in NE becomes:
and firms' profits are:
Then we substitute π f in case 2 into the conditions that have been drawn in Section 6.1:
. This is the so-called negative externality.
(ii)
∂z . As the purpose of adopting the strategy is to increase q f , we can assume this term is positive (the sufficient condition is that a > t d δ).
Thus we get the result that dπ f dz > 0. This indicates that to adopt ISO14001 promotes the output of firm f . Such response is described by Fudenburg and Tirole (1984) as "Fat Cat Effect".
Case 3:
Only domestic firm has adopted ISO14001.
At this time the reward has been reversed. Now domestic firm gets the credit of cost reduction (in the form of comsumer surplus gain). Foreign firm's profit function is the same as in case 1:
and domestic firm's profit changes:
The best reply function for each firm becomes:
Compared to case 2, the forms of firms' profits have also been reversed:
In this case, (i)
And we obtain dπ d dz > 0. Similar to case 2, firm d also raises its output due to ISO14001 adoption. Consequently, we have the following proposition. Proof: In case 1, the slope of equation (10) is − 1 2 , and the intercept of foreign firm's response is a − t f δ. While in case 2, the slope of equation (16) on the y axle. Meanwhile the response of domestic firm does not change. The mechanism is presented in Figure 3a . The intuition is that after adopting ISO14001, foreign firm's output level in equilibrium increases, which means the performance of foreign firm has improved (q * f 2 > q * f 1 ). If we apply the same methodology to case 3, we will have the same conclusion for domestic firm as well, as shown in Figure 3b .
Proposition 2:
Foreign firm has more incentive to adopt ISO14001 than domestic firm does. And the incentive gap increases with 1) the initial capital level a; 2) the expansion of the abatement technology gap (|t d − t f |) between the two firms.
Proof: Here in order to compare the incentive, we need to calculate the final benefit for each firm given the condition of ISO14001 and measure their difference from the base case. To get intuitive idea, we use numerical examples. On the premise that firms' output only take positive values, we try several combinations: 
From a) and b), we can see that holding other elements constant, the higher a is, the more foreign firm will be motivated to adopt ISO14001 than domestic firm does.
From a) and c), we can see that holding other elements constant, the larger the technology difference |t d − t f | is, the more foreign firm will be motivated to adopt ISO14001 than domestic firm does 15 .
Apart from the propostions we have given, it is easy to realize firm's performance in terms of waste control will be improved after adopting ISO14001. The reason is that we have made the assumption in the very beginning that the treated waste is proportionate to a firm's output. Since ISO14001 promotes both firms' outputs, the waste that has been properly dealt will also increase. This model provides enough evidence for the empirical findings we have achieved in the previous section.
Conclusion
We use the firm level data from 2007-2009 in Vietnam to investigate the impact of the adoption of ISO14001, a voluntary environmental standard. In the empirical verification, two-stage selection model is applied to correct for the potential selection bias. The results show that foreign firms are more likely to adopt ISO14001, and the adoption does affect firms' overall performance, ranging from reduction on waste discharge to turnover and productivity. We use propensity score matching as the robustness check and obtain consistent results. Apart from that, a dynamic game theoretical model is employed to shed light on the mechnism behind the empirical result. This finding is in according with most of the existing literature 16 . It also provides evidence to refute the critics of "pollution haven" and makes acknowledgeable foreign firms' effort towards environmental protection. In the meantime we are aware of the limitation of this study. With more detailed information, we would like to extend our analysis to investigation into more specific industries and regions.
Vietnam is undergoing fast economic transition, however, it is important for Vietnamese government to realize its current situation of industrial pollution. We hope this paper can offer decision-makers some clue to explore the real source of pollution and come up with more efficient ways to protect the environment. 
